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Eximbank Lending: 
A Federal Program That Costs Too Much* 
John H. Boyd, Senior Economist 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Too good to be true may be a tired phrase, but it seems to 
fit the claims made for a large, relatively obscure federal 
agency, the Export-Import Bank of the United States 
(Eximbank).
1 This agency tries to encourage the exporting 
of U.S. goods and services, primarily by offering loans to 
foreign importers at rates cheaper than they could get 
elsewhere. In doing this, Eximbank claims to cost its 
owners, U.S. taxpayers, nothing, since it does not receive 
money from Congress and is run instead much like a 
private firm. In fact, some say, the agency may actually be 
benefiting taxpayers, since its books usually show a profit. 
To economists, despite Eximbank's profit, the fact that 
the agency offers loans at below-market rates is a sure sign 
of a subsidy for which someone, usually taxpayers, must 
pay. An accounting profit merely means Eximbank's 
recorded income is exceeding its recorded expenses. For 
an economic profit—that is, a real benefit to taxpayers— 
Eximbank's income must exceed its recorded expenses 
plus its owners' opportunity cost, a payment to taxpayers 
for investing their funds in this agency rather than 
somewhere else. Recent data show clearly that, in order to 
offer loans at below-market rates, Eximbank has been 
giving taxpayers a below-market return on their invest-
ment. The difference between the return they could have 
been making and Eximbank's return has thus been the 
agency's hidden cost to taxpayers. 
Were Eximbank a private firm rather than a govern-
ment agency, one must suspect that its owners would have 
pulled out long ago in favor of a truly profitable enterprise. 
Just how large the owners' hidden cost is matters for the 
continuation of a government program, though. If the cost 
is fairly small, the program may be justified by some 
greater benefits to society as a whole which the program 
provides as side eifects. 
Several studies of Eximbank's lending program have 
tried to measure its hidden direct cost, or subsidy. Using 
simple measures of the opportunity cost of taxpayers' 
funds, they have generally concluded that the subsidy 
exists and is moderate. These estimates of the subsidy 
have been small enough for supporters of Eximbank to 
argue, apparently successfully, that the subsidy is dwarfed 
by the program's large positive side effects on, for 
example, export demand and employment. Overall, sup-
porters have said, the benefits to society of Eximbank's 
lending program far exceed its costs. 
My study of Eximbank's lending program points to 
quite a different conclusion. A formal cost-benefit analysis 
of the program, it improves on previous studies by using a 
theoretically defensible measure of the opportunity cost of 
taxpayers' invested funds to evaluate the benefits they 
receive from Eximbank lending. Based on the costs and 
benefits coming directly through Eximbank, my study 
concludes that during the years studied, 1976-80, Exim-
bank's lending program was indeed subsidized and much 
more heavily than previous studies have suggested. Ac-
cording to my estimates, this program's annual costs 
exceeded its benefits by an average of about $200 million. 
The subsidy increased substantially over the sample 
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'in fiscal 1980, Eximbank ranked third among the U.S. government's direct 
loan programs. The top five had the following loan obligations or commitments: 
Agricultural Credit and Insurance, $7.5 billion; Rural Housing Insurance Fund, 
$6.8 billion; Export-Import Bank, $5.5 billion; Agricultural Price Supports, $4.9 
billion; Federal Housing Administration, $3.0 billion (U.S. President, various 
dates). 
1 period and by 1980 may have reached as high as $650 
million. 
Obviously, side effects, or indirect benefits, would have 
to be significant to overwhelm direct costs of that magni-
tude. Whether or not they are is highly questionable. 
Eximbank's indirect benefits are extremely hard to identi-
fy, much less measure. Some arguments about side effects 
benefiting society are flawed, and some can be countered 
with arguments that the effect is a cost, not a benefit. Given 
this ambiguity, and my new estimates of the subsidy, it 
seems inappropriate to count on indirect benefits to justify 
a costly government program like Eximbank lending. 
Eximbank's Ends and Means 
Eximbank's current broad objective has evolved some-
what haphazardly over its nearly 50-year history. When 
first chartered by executive order in 1934, the bank's 
objective was to promote trade just between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. During the worldwide 
depression before World War II, its objective was ex-
panded to include assisting in domestic U.S. recovery and 
providing credits which were unobtainable from private 
sources. During World War II, Eximbank was used 
strategically, providing export credits to U.S. allies, and 
immediately after the war, it served as a reconstruction 
lender to western Europe. In the 1950s, the agency's 
attention shifted primarily to less-developed nations, 
particularly those in Latin America, serving as a develop-
ment bank to the western hemisphere. Finally, in the 
1960s, Eximbank changed its emphasis once more, away 
from developmental projects and toward the explicit 
promotion of U.S. exports. This last change of focus 
originally reflected governmental concern over the gradual 
deterioration in the U.S. trade position. The policy has 
continued to the present day, and Eximbank is now best 
described as a general export credit agency of the United 
States government.
2 
A general rationale for this type of government agency 
is usually found in the problems inherent in cross-border 
trade. For example, the buyers and sellers involved in 
export transactions are often thousands of miles apart and 
know little about one another. Because of this distance and 
unfamiliarity, importers may be unwilling to pay in ad-
vance of arrival and inspection of the goods, but exporters 
may be unwilling to extend credit. Without some kind of 
government intervention to overcome such problems, it is 
thought, many export transactions would not be made. 
Eximbank has designed several programs aimed at 
making the export of U.S. goods and services less 
problematic. One program is insurance which Eximbank 
offers to U.S. exporters. For a premium, the bank will 
insure against default by the importer/borrower. More-
over, it will insure against forms of risk which are unique to 
cross-border lending: for example, the possibility that war, 
revolution, expropriation, or currency inconvertibility 
may render the importer unable to pay even if it is willing. 
Since the proceeds of insurance are assignable to banks, 
the insurance policy stands as excellent collateral for third-
party financing and is often used in that way. Insurance is 
available for short- and intermediate-term credits, of up to 
five years maturity. The Eximbank insurance program is 
quite large, with about $6 billion of policies in force as of 
September 1980 (Export-Import Bank, various dates). 
Eximbank's long-term support takes the form of either 
loans made directly to foreign borrowers or loan guaran-
tees given to private U.S. financial institutions. These two 
forms of support are often combined in a single package in 
which Eximbank agrees to be repaid after the private 
lender. The effect is to create a short-maturity guaranteed 
loan for the private lender (usually a commercial bank) 
and a long-maturity loan for the agency. 
By far the largest of Eximbank's operations is its direct 
lending program. As of September 1980, its outstanding 
direct loans totaled $13.8 billion (Export-Import Bank, 
various dates). The longest maturity on these loans is 
normally 12 years, although exceptions may be made 
under special circumstances. In recent years, the average 
maturity of new loans has been about 7 years (U.S. 
President, various dates). Most typically financed by 
Eximbank are exports of long-lived capital goods, espe-
cially aircraft and machinery, goods which are produced 
by a handful of large U.S. corporations.
3 Interest rates are 
always fixed for the life of the loan, and Eximbank will 
commit to a rate up to 180 days in advance of lending 
without charging a commitment fee.
4 
2See Rendell 1976 for an excellent discussion of Eximbank's origins and 
early history. 
3In 1980, for example, 27 percent of the bank's loans went to finance Boeing 
Company exports. Another 40 percent went to Westinghouse, Combustion 
Engineering, McDonnell Douglas, Western Electric, Lockheed, and General 
Electric (Reilly 1981, p. 42). 
4More complete discussions of the loan, guarantee, and insurance programs, 
their terms and conditions, may be found in Export-Import Bank, undated. A brief 
but excellent description is provided in Continental Bank, undated. 
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The Subsidy: Where It Comes From 
and Where It Goes 
In many ways, Eximbank operates much like a private 
commercial bank. It borrows in one market and lends in 
another, it is exposed to risk of default and risk of interest 
rate fluctuations, and it usually earns an accounting profit. 
Also like a private corporation, Eximbank is financed 
partly with debt and partly with equity, the equity being 
composed of an initial investment (of $ 1 billion by the U.S. 
Treasury) and retained earnings (of about $2.2 billion so 
far). 
In other ways, Eximbank is different from a commercial 
bank, however. It has a highly specialized loan portfolio 
composed exclusively of export credits, and as discussed 
above, it has a large insurance program. In addition, 
Eximbank has special advantages given to it by Congress. 
It borrows from the Treasury at a risk-free rate of interest, 
through the Federal Financing Bank, and it pays no taxes. 
Its equity is held by the government sector and is not 
required to earn a market rate of return for the agency to 
stay in business. 
These special advantages over commercial banks let 
Eximbank offer low interest rates on its loans and yet still 
show a profit in most years. Eximbank's authority to 
borrow funds at a risk-free rate of interest through the 
Federal Financing Bank helps it profit; commercial 
lenders with loan portfolios as risky as Eximbank's must 
pay a premium over the risk-free rate when they raise 
funds in private credit markets.
5 Cheap funds aren't 
enough to let Eximbank profit, though, since on average it 
charges importers even less than the risk-free rate of 
interest. In order to show a profit while lending at rates 
lower than those at which it borrows, Eximbank exploits 
another of its special advantages. It finances some of its 
lending with equity instead of credit and pays its equity 
holders, U.S. taxpayers, less than a market rate of return 
on their investment. As a result of this equity financing, 
Eximbank loans out more money than it borrows, and the 
total amount of interest it earns on its low-priced loans 
usually exceeds the total amount of interest it pays on its 
higher-priced debts. The difference between interest 
earned and interest paid shows up in Eximbank's books as 
a profit. 
As noted earlier, however, this profit actually indicates 
a loss for U.S. taxpayers. To record the accounting profit, 
remember, Eximbank pays taxpayers a smaller return on 
their investment than they could have received elsewhere. 
(In economic terms, Eximbank does not cover the oppor-
tunity cost of using taxpayers' funds.) During 1976-80, 
for example, the agency's return on equity averaged 4H 
percent. Had taxpayers' investment in Eximbank been 
invested elsewhere, it could have earned much more and 
so made taxpayers better off. If paid to the Treasury on 
behalf of taxpayers, the higher earnings could have been 
passed on to them through lower taxes. If Eximbank had 
simply been shut down and taxpayers' investment re-
turned to them, they individually could have earned the 
higher market return on their funds. The difference be-
tween Eximbank's earnings and the earnings available in 
the private marketplace, then, is the amount taxpayers lose 
as a result of Eximbank's effort to encourage exporting by 
offering importers cheap loans. It is obviously taxpayers 
who pay for this subsidy. 
Who actually gets the subsidy is not quite so obvious. 
When subsidized financing is available to buyers of a 
good, sellers can and will raise their prices. Who captures 
the subsidy therefore depends on how the quantities of 
goods demanded and supplied are affected by changes in 
the good's price, that is, on the shapes of the good's 
demand and supply curves. These shapes are not easy to 
determine and can, of course, be considerably different for 
different types of goods. I will not attempt to define these 
curves for the various types of exports supported by 
Eximbank lending. In general, though, it is reasonable to 
assume that the curves are shaped in a way that causes the 
subsidy to be shared to some extent between buyers and 
sellers, in this case, foreign importers and U.S. exporters. 
The Cost-Benefit Framework 
The fact that Eximbank's direct lending subsidy exists can 
be demonstrated and its size estimated using a form of 
cost-benefit analysis. This procedure is frequently used by 
economists to appraise the desirability of investing in 
public projects such as dams, subways, and airports (Boyd 
and Kwast 1981, Layard 1972). The basic framework is 
fairly simple, closely akin to the capital budgeting proce-
dure used by private enterprises in reaching their invest-
ment decisions. 
For a public project, first its costs are identified and 
estimated, including those incurred directly by the govern-
5Eximbank loans are indeed risky, and, as explained in the box on the 
agency's accounting procedures, it has had significant losses due to loan defaults 
and restructuring. 
3 ment and any indirect costs which may be borne by 
individuals and firms in the private sector. Next the 
project's benefits, both direct and indirect, are identified 
and estimated. All costs and benefits must be quantified, 
and this may be especially difficult for indirect costs and 
benefits—for example, assigning a dollar value to lives 
saved by a better highway or the recreational value of a 
reservoir. Nevertheless, to be able to compare all costs and 
benefits, everything must be put in explicit dollar magni-
tudes. 
Since costs or benefits may occur in future periods as 
well as in the present, and people value dollars available to 
invest now more than dollars promised later, some way 
must be adopted to put all these estimates on the same 
present value basis. The rate used to discount costs and 
benefits must be chosen carefully. It must represent the 
best rate of return the public's resources could have earned 
on a comparably risky project (again, the opportunity cost 
of using these resources). In that way, the costs and 
benefits of the public sector project, when discounted and 
compared, will properly indicate where society would 
benefit most from having its resources invested. 
Comparing those discounted values is, naturally, the 
final step of a cost-benefit analysis. If society's present 
value of estimated benefits exceeds its present value of 
estimated costs, the project can be expected to produce net 
public benefits and, accordingly, should be undertaken. 
Otherwise, it should be passed up. 
My Procedure 
Eximbank's direct lending program already exists, of 
course, so what my cost-benefit analysis will actually be 
doing is determining whether or not it should exist, and if 
not (as I suspect), how big the cost to taxpayers has been. 
The procedure I use includes all of the basic steps of the 
standard procedure, but not quite in the usual order. Since 
the indirect costs and benefits of Eximbank lending are 
very hard to identify and measure, I begin by ignoring them 
and work simply with direct costs and benefits. Once the 
difference between the direct effects has been estimated, I 
discuss the most frequently cited indirect effects. Before 
estimating anything, though, I identify the appropriate way 
to define, discount, and compare direct costs and benefits. 
Then, since selecting a discount rate is so important to a 
proper estimation of costs and benefits, I spend a lot of 
time doing that carefully. In order to do all the calculations 
of costs and benefits efficiently, that is, I postpone all their 
quantifications until after a discount rate has been defined 
and estimated. 
The first task, then, is identification. For Eximbank's 
lending program, direct costs per period, C„ are the dollar 
amount of new direct loans the agency grants in year t. 
These loans can be considered a form of direct government 
investment, that is, resource-using expenditures like the 
building of a subway system or a dam. Since the agency's 
costs are confined to each year, they do not have to be 
discounted. Its direct benefits do, however; in each year 
they are the future stream of payments Eximbank will be 
receiving on the year's lending. Thus, in year t, the costs C, 
produce the benefit streamB, = bl+], bt+2, - - •, bt+,7, where b 
represents payments on both the principal of Eximbank 
loans and the interest on those loans and n is their maturity 
in years. Then, using the standard discounting equation, 
the present value of direct benefits, Tn is 
(1) r, = z;=1 [z>,/(!+<)'] 
where m;is a discount rate (not yet defined). 
This equation does not show all that must be consid-
ered when computing the present value of Eximbank's 
benefits, though. In particular, it does not explicitly show 
how the agency's stream of payments on loans varies over 
time. Recall that Eximbank often cooperates with private 
financial firms in making export loans. In such arrange-
ments, it takes the long maturities on a particular credit, 
and the private lender takes the short maturities. Opera-
tionally, the borrower pays a constant amount of interest 
and principal in each year, but principal payments go first 
to the private lender, until its portion of the loan is paid off, 
and then to Eximbank. The result is that Eximbank's cash 
flows exhibit a discrete increase part way through the life 
of a loan. 
This can be written into the equation representing the 
present value of Eximbank's benefits. To do that, let i[/ be 
the delay in payments to Eximbank as a percentage of 
average loan maturity and mt be the average rate of interest 
on Eximbank's new loans. Further, assume its loans are to 
be repaid semiannually, as is standard for the agency. 




X {[ 1 + (m"J2)] - [ 1 + {m'Jl)]-
21) 
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which is a more useful definition of the present value of 
direct benefits.
6 [Derivation of (2) is straightforward, but 
tedious, and will not be presented.] 
Finally, comparing the present value of direct benefits 
to direct costs, the net present value of benefits, Nn is 
defined simply as 
(3) TV, = rf - Cr 
If, as I expect, N( < 0, this implies that direct costs exceed 
direct benefits and that the public is providing a subsidy of 
amount ~Nt to Eximbank's lending program.
7 
To compute the present value of Eximbank's benefits, I 
use a risk-adjusted private market rate, that is, a rate 
which a competitive private firm would have charged had 
it made the same loans Eximbank did. It can be shown that 
this discount rate correctly represents the opportunity cost 
of the public's resources if private capital markets are 
perfectly competitive and if the government investment 
under consideration is in a risk class available to the 
private sector (Holmstrom 1980, Sandmo 1974). Scores 
of empirical tests have shown that private U.S. capital 
markets are extremely efficient and perfectly, or at least 
nearly perfectly, competitive.
8 Thus, the first condition is 
approximately met. The particular type of government 
investment considered here, dollar-denominated export 
loans, is routinely held by private commercial banks, and 
these banks issue securities that are publicly traded. Thus, 
there is reason to believe that Eximbank's investments are 
in a risk class available to the private sector. It follows that 
a risk-adjusted private market discount rate is appropriate 
here. 
Estimating the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate 
A Formula for a Very Good Proxy 
The next task is to actually estimate the risk-adjusted 
private discount rate, m*. Unfortunately, that rate cannot 
be found directly: meaningful data on the terms of private 
export loans are almost impossible to obtain. Commercial 
banks rarely disclose the terms of individual loan contracts. 
Published data on average loan rates are of little value for 
this purpose, since the effective cost of a bank loan may 
depend on commitment fees, compensating balances, 
collateral requirements, and many other terms not publicly 
disclosed. 
Previous studies of Eximbank's lending subsidy have 
responded to this data problem by using estimates based 
on generally undefensible definitions of the discount rate. 
Since the appropriate rate is not available, some studies 
have simply selected a rate that is available, like a cor-
porate or government bond rate. Others have tried to get a 
feel for what the discount rate might be by subjectively 
examining the credit market during their sample periods. 
These techniques leave the studies open to criticism and 
generally of questionable value. 
To avoid that result for my study, I try to firmly ground 
my estimates of the discount rate in economic theory. I 
circumvent the data problem by taking advantage of a 
well-known principle from financial economics: in equilib-
rium, a value-maximizing firm will set the marginal rate of 
return on its assets equal to the marginal cost of its capital. 
Thus, an estimate of the latter is also an estimate of the 
former, at least in equilibrium. The cost of capital is the 
cost of raising funds, either debt or equity, in the securities 
markets (see the box). While not a simple task, estimating 
this cost is easier than trying to find meaningful data on 
loan rates. To estimate the risk-adjusted private discount 
rate, therefore, I try to estimate what theory suggests 
should be a very good proxy: the cost of capital which 
would have confronted Eximbank had it been a private 
financial intermediary. In that case, it would have had to 
pay taxes, borrow in corporate debt markets, and earn a 
market-determined rate of return on equity, so I take all of 
that into account in my calculations. The idea is to produce 
estimates of the cost of capital which are comparable to the 
loan rates that Eximbank would have had to charge (just to 
break even) had it received no special treatment from the 
government. 
It can be shown that when a private firm is financed 
partly with debt, L, and partly with equity, E, and seeks to 
maximize its market value, V,(V = E + L) this objective 
will be achieved by acquiring assets up to the point at 
which 
(4) m*= [re{\—K)/{\—x)\ + rtK 
6The rate earned by Eximbank is actually somewhat lower than the effective 
rate of interest paid by the borrower because of the delay in principal repayments. 
7Noninterest operating costs of Eximbank should, in principle, be included in 
C,. This is not done here because I have no basis for allocating overhead expenses 
between direct lending and the other programs. Noninterest operating costs are 
relatively small, however, typically amounting to less than 2 percent of total 
expenses (Export-Import Bank, various dates). 
8For an excellent review of empirical tests of capital market efficiency, see 
Dyckman, Downes, and Magee 1975. 
5 where r is the firm's tax rate (assumed constant), re is the 
cost of equity capital, r, is the cost of debt, and K = L/V. 
[For simplicity, I have omitted time subscripts in (4) and 
will do so hereafter. Condition (4) is derived in the 
Appendix.] The left-hand side of (4) is the marginal rate of 
return on the firm's assets, which is, of course, what I want 
to estimate. In value-maximizing equilibrium, this is set 
equal to a weighted average of the costs of debt and equity 
capital. The weights, K = L/V and 1 — K = El V, are in 
market values and must sum to 1. The required rate of 
return on equity is adjusted by the factor 1/(1—r), 
reflecting the fact that returns to equity are taxable at the 
corporate level. 
Estimates of the Components 
of the Cost of Capital 
Although I now have a formula defining the discount rate, 
actually estimating that rate is still a relatively complicated 
procedure. It involves estimating all the parameters of 
equation (4)—rh re, K, and r—that is, all the components 
of the cost of capital that Eximbank would have faced had 
it been a private firm. 
To estimate rh I can use some published data on the 
general cost of borrowing in the market. To estimate re, K, 
and r, however, I need a sample of commercial banks with 
operating characteristics as similar as possible to those of 
Eximbank.
9 As shown in Table 1, the sample banks I have 
chosen share three important characteristics: they are 
large, they emphasize corporate as opposed to consumer 
or mortgage lending, and a substantial proportion of their 
loans is to foreign corporations or governments. The idea 
is, had Eximbank been a private bank, it would have been 
similar to those in the sample. Historical averages of data 
from the sample banks are therefore used to estimate the 
values of re, K, and r that would have confronted 
Eximbank. 
My sample period is the five years 1976-80. I make 
two different estimates for both the cost of debt, rh and the 
cost of equity, re, in each year studied. This lets me 
estimate a range of values for the discount rate, m*\ that is, 
it lets me establish its general size, a more reasonable goal 
than pinpoint accuracy. The superscripts h and / denote 
high and low values, respectively. In what follows, a caret 
or hat (-) on a variable denotes an estimated value and a 
tilde (~) denotes a random variable. 
• The Tax Rate, r 
I estimate Eximbank's tax bracket as the arithmetic 
average tax rate for the sample banks, f, and for simplicity, 
assume that marginal and average tax rates are equal. As 
indicated in Table 2, the average tax rate for this group of 
banks was quite stable in 1976-80 at about 37 percent. 
• The Cost of Debt, r, 
I assume that if Eximbank had been a private firm, it would 
have borrowed at the long-term corporate bond rate. Since 
how its debt would have been received by the market is not 
clear, two different rates are assumed, Moody's Aaa and 
A, denoted r\ and r
hh respectively. All five sample banks 
have term debt outstanding, and all are rated Aaa or Aa. 
Therefore, the assumption of an A rating for Eximbank is 
Defining the Cost of Capital 
Financial economists frequently refer to the cost of equity 
capital or the required rate of return on equity, identical 
concepts. This rate of return, my re, is a market concept, not an 
accounting concept, and it is important to distinguish between 
the two. 
Consider an imaginary corporation which earns D dollars 
per share of common stock and pays out all its earnings in the 
form of dividends. If its stock sells for P dollars per share in the 
marketplace, then re = DIP. Here re is the market rate of return, 
the rate that will actually be earned by an investor who buys the 
stock for P dollars per share. The accounting rate of return on 
equity is defined as D/BO, where BO is the book value per share. 
Naturally, market and book values can be very different. 
Note also that, since re is defined in terms of the market value 
of the firm's stock, it is determined by market forces of supply 
and demand. For example, if investors believe that our imagi-
nary company has for some reason become riskier, they will sell 
its shares in the market, causing P to fall and re to rise. This 
process will continue until re just equals the rate of return which 
investors require given their revised risk perceptions—hence, 
the name required rate of return on equity. A comparable but 
more complicated version of re can be derived when future 
earnings per share are uncertain and when the firm retains all or 
part of its earnings. This is equation (6). 
The cost of debt or required rate of return on debt, rh is 
defined in the same way. Assume that the imaginary company 
has bonds outstanding and that each bond pays I dollars in 
annual interest. Then, if B is the market value of a bond, rt=I/B. 
Like re, rl is determined by market forces of supply and demand. 
actually estimating that rate is still a relatively complicated 
procedure. It involves estimating all the parameters of 
equation (4)—rh re, K, and r—that is, all the components 
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operating characteristics as similar as possible to those of 
Eximbank.
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capital or the required rate of return on equity, identical 
concepts. This rate of return, my re, is a market concept, not an 
accounting concept, and it is important to distinguish between 
the two. 
Consider an imaginary corporation which earns D dollars 
per share of common stock and pays out all its earnings in the 
form of dividends. If its stock sells for P dollars per share in the 
marketplace, then re = DIP. Here re is the market rate of return, 
the rate that will actually be earned by an investor who buys the 
stock for P dollars per share. The accounting rate of return on 
equity is defined as D/BO, where BO is the book value per share. 
Naturally, market and book values can be very different. 
Note also that, since re is defined in terms of the market value 
of the firm's stock, it is determined by market forces of supply 
and demand. For example, if investors believe that our imagi-
nary company has for some reason become riskier, they will sell 
its shares in the market, causing P to fall and re to rise. This 
process will continue until re just equals the rate of return which 
investors require given their revised risk perceptions—hence, 
the name required rate of return on equity. A comparable but 
more complicated version of re can be derived when future 
earnings per share are uncertain and when the firm retains all or 
part of its earnings. This is equation (6). 
The cost of debt or required rate of return on debt, rh is 
defined in the same way. Assume that the imaginary company 
has bonds outstanding and that each bond pays I dollars in 
annual interest. Then, if B is the market value of a bond, rt=I/B. 
Like re, rl is determined by market forces of supply and demand. 
9The sample firms are actually bank holding companies. Most large 
commercial banks have the holding company form of organization, and in almost 
all cases it is holding company shares that are traded in the equity market. 
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Table 1 
Operating Characteristics of the Sample Banks 
and the Export-Import Bank 
December 1980 
Total  Total Loans* 
Percentages of Total Loans 
Assets 
($ billion) 
as a Percentage 





Citicorp  114.9  66%  55%  57% 
Chase Manhattan Corporation  76.2  62  61  57 
J.P. Morgan & Company  52.0  51  78e  55 
First Chicago Corporation  28.7  59  45  39 
First National Boston Corporation  16.0  55  73  39 
Export-Import Bank  14.1  98%  n.a.  100% 
*Loans and lease financing 
e = estimated 
n.a. = not available 
Sources: Annual reports of the sample banks and the Export-Import Bank of the United States 
intentionally conservative. Table 2 shows the Aaa and A 
rates over the sample period along with the average rate of 
interest on the new debt Eximbank issued. The value of 
Eximbank's government guarantee was obviously substan-
tial, reducing interest costs by an average of about 50 basis 
points below the Aaa rate and about 115 basis points 
below the A rate. 
• The Cost of Equity, re 
One common way to estimate the cost of equity capital for 




 Under the appropriate assumptions (Litzen-
berger, Ramaswamy, and Sosin 1980), the CAPM 
predicts that 
(5) re = rf+p[E(rm)-rf] 
where 
re = the cost of equity 
rf = the risk-free rate of interest 
E(rm) = the expected rate of return on 
the market portfolio of all assets 
P = cov (re, rj/var (rj 
rm = the realized rate of return on the 
market portfolio 
re = the realized rate of return on a given 
common stock. 
(Here cov = covariance and var = variance. A stock's 
or beta, measures the degree to which its returns move with 
the overall market. An average stock, which moves pro-
portionately with the market, has a beta of 1.) 
In (5), the cost of equity capital is equal to the risk-free 
rate of interest plus a firm-specific risk premium. The firm-
specific risk premium is, in turn, the product of a market 
risk premium, E(rm) — rf, and the firm's p. In this study, 
See Litzenberger, Ramaswamy, and Sosin 1980 for a discussion of such 
applications in the public utilities industry. 
7 Table 2 
Estimates of the Cost of Capital and Its Components 
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980 
The Tax Rate, f t  36.5%  36.0%  38.6%  35.7%  37.3% 
The Cost of Debt 
Moody's Corporate Bond Rates 
A Rate, r*  9.1%  8.5%  9.1%  10.2%  12.9% 
Aaa Rate, r'  8.4  8.0  8.7  9.6  11.9 
Average Interest Rate 
on Eximbank's New Debt  7.9  7.3  8.3  9.4  11.2 
The Cost of Equity 
High (risk premium 6.1 ),r
he  11.1 %  11.4%  13.2%  16.2%  1 7.5% 
Low (risk premium 2.2), r'e  7.2  7.5  9.4  12.3  13.6 
The Cost of Capital 
High, m*^  10.0%  9.4%  10.2%  11.5%  13.7% 
Low, m*
1  8.8  8.5  9.4  10.6  12.5 
Average Interest Rate 
on Eximbank's New Loans, m  7.8  8.1  8.5  8.3  8.3 
tTax liability as a percentage of income before taxes and security gains and losses 
Sources: Annual reports of the sample banks and the Export-Import Bank of the United States; Federal Reserve 
Bulletin; Value Line; U.S. President, various dates; my equations (4) and (5) 
estimates of p for each sample bank are taken from Value 
Line, and the risk-free rate of interest is simply represented 
by the three-month Treasury bill rate. Estimating E(rm) is 
harder, since this is a market expectation and, over 
considerable periods of time, realized rates of return may 
be different than expected rates. However, Ibbotson and 
Sinquefield (1979) found that over a very long period of 
time (1926-78) the average risk premium on Standard & 
Poor's 500 market index was 6.2 percent. My estimates 
assume that this relationship was maintained, or that E(rm) 
— rf= .062.1 compute the cost of equity capital for each 
year, for each of the five sample banks, according to (5). 
Then for each year I estimate the expected rate of return on 
Eximbank equity, r
he, as the arithmetic average of returns 
for the sample banks. These are shown in Table 2. 
Another common way to estimate the cost of equity 
capital for private firms is to capitalize an expected stream 
of future dividends. If, for example, the future expected 
growth rate in dividends per share isis (£) ad infinitum, and 
current dividends and current price per share are D and P, 
respectively, it can be shown that 
(6) re = (DIP) + E(g). 
In equilibrium, P will be set so that r just equals the 
market's required rate of return, given the perceived risk of 
the stock (see the box on the cost of capital). 
D and P are easily measured, but E(g) is another 
8 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Re view/Winter 1982 
expectations variable which cannot be observed directly. 
As a proxy measure for E(g), I use historical growth rates 
in dividends per share over the period 1976-80.1 assume 
that investors use historical data to form their expectations 
and that, as of 1980, they expected past growth trends to 
continue. For each sample bank, E(g) is estimated in this 
way, and the bank's dividend/price ratio is computed at the 
end of 1980. Summing these two provides an estimate of 
each bank's cost of equity capital as of that date.
1
1 
Finally, Eximbank's cost of equity is estimated as the 
arithmetic average of the individual sample banks' cost of 
equity capital. Defining (D/P)mo as the sample average 
dividend/price ratio at yearend 1980 and E(g)mo as the 
sample average expected growth in dividends per share at 
yearend 1980,1 can compute the yearend cost of equity:
1
2 
(7) (^>,980 = (^/>)l980 + ^C#)l980 
= .062 + .074 = .136. 
This estimate of Eximbank's 1980 cost of equity is 
considerably lower than that obtained using the CAPM 
(. 136 versus . 175) and implies an average risk premium of 
only about .022 instead of .061.
1
3
 The reason for the 
discrepancy is unclear, since both methods are based on 
expectations variables which must be proxied. I may have 
incorrectly estimated the expected growth in dividends, 
the market risk premium, the banks' betas, or some 
combination of these. Therefore, in the following computa-
tions I use two separate estimates of the cost of equity: a 
high estimate assuming a risk premium of .061 and a low 
estimate assuming a risk premium of .022. 
• The Market Weight, K 
In equation (4), AT is defined in terms of market values ofL 
and is; that is, K = L/(E+L). Therefore, I must estimate 
the market values of debt and equity which would have 
been observed had Eximbank been a private firm. Pub-
lished balance sheet data are not good proxies for market 
data here because Eximbank earned substantially below-
market rates of return on both debt and equity. The 
approach I use is to estimate L and E by discounting the 
relevant cash flows from the income statement. 
To estimate the market value of equity I discount 
profits, net of predicted taxes, at the cost of equity capital. 
Thus, if 77 = the total profits Eximbank reported and E = 
the estimated market value of equity, then 
(8) E = Tr(\—t)/re. 
The market value of debt is estimated in a similar way. 
In this case, however, I invoke the simplifying assumption 
of a flat term structure, which permits the valuation of 
Eximbank debt as if it were of infinite maturity. That is, I 
capitalize interest payments only, ignoring the repayment 
of principal. Over the sample period the yield curve had a 
positive slope about as often as a negative one, so the 




 Therefore, with / = the total interest 
expense Eximbank reported, the market value of Exim-
bank debt is estimated as 
(9) L = I/r, 
Table 3 shows the estimated market values of debt and 
equity, as well as the accounting values reported by 
Eximbank, in each of the sample years, 1976-80. It shows 
two estimates of each market value, one derived with the 
high cost of capital, the other with the low. 
As could be expected, given the below-market rates of 
return, estimated market values are consistently lower 
than accounting values, reflecting a probable bias in the 
accounting data. On average, the accounting value of debt 
exceeds its market value by 28 percent or 37 percent, 
depending on which estimate is used. Much more striking, 
the average accounting value of equity exceeds its market 
value by 333 or 477 percent. The result is that financial 
leverage (debt as a percentage of equity or assets) is much 
greater when computed with market values than it is with 
accounting data. Or, put another way, Eximbank is much 
1 'i have tried several alternative methods to estimate the historical rate of 
growth in dividends per share. The results are not particularly sensitive to the 
method used. 
12Nearby dates have been checked to be sure the dividend/price ratios as of 
the end of 1980 are not abnormal. They do not appear to be. 
13Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1979) estimated the market risk premium to be 
.062. The average risk premium for my sample banks is slightly lower, .061, 
because the average beta is less than 1. 
14With publicly available data, the maturity structure of all Eximbank debt 
outstanding during the sample period cannot be determined. According to the 
Office of Management and Budget, however, the average maturity of newly 
issued Eximbank debt has consistently been about 7 years. Invoking the heroic 
assumption that all debt issues had a 7-year original maturity, the average 
maturity of outstandings was approximately 3Yi years. 
I have estimated the market value of Export-Import debt assuming a 3 ^-year 
maturity, and these estimates are quite similar to those based on the assumption of 
an infinite maturity. This reflects the fact that the yield curve is generally quite flat 
beyond a few years maturity. 
9 more highly levered than one would conclude from exam-
ining its balance sheet.
1
5 
Estimates of m* 
Now I have all the parameter estimates that equation (4) 
requires to compute the private cost of capital, m *, which, 
remember, is my proxy for the market rate private firms 
would have charged for the loans Eximbank made. My 
estimates of m* are in Table 2 where, again, there are high 
and low estimates for each period. The high estimate, m*h, 
assumes the A bond rate and a 6.1 percent risk premium 
on equity, whereas the low estimate, m*l9 assumes the Aaa 
bond rate and a 2.2 percent equity risk premium. For 
comparison, Table 2 also shows the average rate actually 
earned on new Eximbank loans, m. Notice that, in every 
year, m < m*> < m*h\ the realized rate of return on 
Eximbank lending was always less than both estimates of 
the private cost of capital, or the rate private firms would 
have received. This, of course, suggests that Eximbank 
was lending at be low-market, subsidized rates. 
Estimating Eximbank's Lending Subsidy 
My Estimates 
With the hardest part of the job completed, I can now 
return to the basics of cost-benefit analysis—quantifying 
costs and benefits, discounting benefits, and comparing 
costs and benefits in search of Eximbank's lending 
subsidy. 
Except for one item, Table 4 shows all the additional 
data required for my computations. It shows the total 
amount of new direct loans Eximbank made in each year, 
which are the direct costs of its lending, C. It also shows the 
average rate of interest on those loans when they were first 
issued, m, and their average maturity, n. These data, 
remember, determine the direct benefit stream, B, attribut-
able to each year's loans. The item missing from Table 4, 
needed to compute the present value of direct benefits, is 
an estimate of if/, the delay in payments to Eximbank 
which results from the agency sharing loans with private 
financial firms. In a detailed study of Eximbank's lending 
practices in 1979-80, Baron (1981) found that the 
average delay in principal repayments to the agency was 
about 40 percent of a loan's term to maturity; that is, on a 
ten-year loan, for example, Eximbank would begin receiv-
ing principal repayments after the fourth year. In comput-
ing the present value of benefits according to equation (2), 
therefore, I assume that ^ = 40 percent. 
Using these data with my estimates of the discount rate, 
m\ in equations (2) and (3) results in the net present values 
of benefits shown in Table 4. Since all of these values are 
negative, they are actually net costs. That substantiates the 
suspicion that in 1976-80 Eximbank lending was consis-
tently subsidized by U.S. taxpayers. 
The cost to taxpayers does not appear to have been 
small or stable, especially lately. According to the low and 
high estimates, the subsidy averaged between $168 
million and $248 million per year. It increased substan-
tially during the last two sample years, more than doubling 
in both 1979 and 1980, and by 1980 it was somewhere 
between $521 million and $653 million. These increases 
can be partly explained by increased Eximbank lending 
during 1979-80, but they were also due to an increased 
spread between the rates private firms would have charged 
on Eximbank's loans (the opportunity cost of taxpayers' 
funds) and the rate Eximbank charged. This increased 
spread is reflected in the subsidy rate, shown in the last two 
columns of Table 4, which measures the dollar amount of 
the subsidy as a percentage of the dollar amount of loans 
made. Even though lending increased considerably in the 
last two sample years, the subsidy rate did too, and by 
1980 it was between 15 and 20 percent. These results 
clearly reflect a major Eximbank policy shift which began 
in early 1978. At that time, the agency announced an 
aggressive policy of supporting U.S. exports by lending 
more and at lower rates relative to market rates (Burnett 
1979, Reilly 1981). Apparently the policy was successful, 
at least in the sense that it greatly increased the subsidy.
1
6 
Other Studies' Estimates 
My estimates of Eximbank's lending subsidy improve on 
previously available estimates. As pointed out earlier, the 
discount rate I used to compute the subsidy is well-
grounded in economic theory, whereas the rates other 
studies used are not. A comparison of our results shows 
I5Eximbank has long maintained that it is better capitalized than the largest 
private banks (U.S. Congress 1981 b, pp. 13-14), and that is true if one compares 
accounting data. In 1980, for example, the accounting ratio of debt to total assets 
was an average of .960 for sample banks, compared with .772 for Eximbank. If 
this ratio is computed with market values, however, Eximbank's advantage 
shrinks considerably. The 1980 sample bank average was .973, while Eximbank 
had a value between .934 and .944. 
16The policy also produced some problems for Eximbank. Reported profits 
declined by about 50 percent in 1980, and losses are projected for 1981, 1982, 
and beyond. A recent General Accounting Office study was extremely critical of 
the bank, questioning the adequacy of its loss reserves and its ability to survive 
without appropriated funds (U.S. Congress 1981b). 
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Table 3 
Reported Accounting Values and Estimated Market Values* 
of Eximbank Capitalization 
Total Debt, /_($ million)  Total Equity, E ($  i million)  Total Capitalization, V ($ million)  Leverage** (%) 
Book  Market Value  Book  Market Value  Book  Market Value  Book  Market Value 
Value  L  L
h  Value  E
1  E
h  Value  High  Low  Value  High Low 
1976  8,169  6,173  5,698  2,719  1,018  660  10,888  7,191  6,358  75.0  85.8 89.7 
1977  8,785  7,792  7,334  2,850  1,172  771  11,635  8,964  8,105  75.5  86.9 90.5 
1978  8,709  7,323  7,001  2,954  909  647  11,663  8,232  7,648  74.7  88.9 91.5 
1979  8,936  7,026  6,613  3,078  830  630  12,014  7,856  7,243  74.4  89.4 91.3 
1980  10,807  7,139  6,586  3,187  506  393  13,994  7,645  6,979  77.2  93.4 94.4 
*Two market value estimates are shown. 
The high values are calculated using the low discount rate and the low values using the high rate. 
**Total debt as a percentage of total assets 
Sources: Export-I mport Bank, various dates; my Table 2 and equations (8) and (9) 
Table 4 
Estimates of the Costs, Benefits, and Subsidy 
of Eximbank Lending 
Costs  Benefits  Subsidy  Subsidy Rate 
Net Present 
New  Average  Average  PresentValue  ValueofBenefits  Subsidy as a 
Loans Made  Rate of  Maturity  ($ million)  (r-C, $ million)  Percentage of 
($ million)  Interest  (Years)  High  Low  High  Low  Loans Made 
C  m  n  f'  rh  N1  Nh  -N'/C  —Nh/C 
1976  2,206  7.8%  8  2,148  2,032  -58  -174  2.6%  7.9% 
1977  1,789  8.1  6  1,713  1,658  -76  -131  4.2  7.3 
1978  1,260  8.5  7  1,220  1,178  -40  -82  3.2  6.5 
1979  1,629  8.3  7  1,483  1,429  -146  -200  9.0  12.3 
1980  3,288  8.3  7  2,767  2,635  -521  -653  15.8  19.9 
Sources: Export-Import Bank, various dates; U.S. President, various dates; my Table 2 and equations (2) and (3) 
11 how misleading ad hoc techniques have been. 
To compare results, though, my estimates of Exim-
bank's lending subsidy must first be translated into the rate 
spread referred to in the last section. Previous studies have 
not used my cost-benefit framework and so do not have net 
present value estimates which can be directly compared to 
mine. However, they have estimated the difference be-
tween the opportunity cost of funds and Eximbank's loan 
rate, my m* — m (or at least the components necessary to 
compute this spread). 
Table 5 compares several other studies' estimates of 
the rate spread to mine. Each of the previous studies used a 
different measure of the opportunity cost of funds, and 
again, unlike mine, none of these measures was derived 
from an explicit theoretical framework. A study by Wallen 
(which only estimated the subsidy for 1980) used long-
term government bond rates (U.S. Congress 1980), and 
one by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used the 
Aaa corporate bond rate (U.S. Congress 1981 a). A study 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) used a 
judgemental estimate of this cost, an estimate determined 
by subjective analysis of credit market conditions (U.S. 
President, various dates). 
The comparison shows clearly that, while earlier 
studies found a subsidy in Eximbank lending too, their ad 
hoc methods of estimating m* caused them to greatly 
underestimate the subsidy, particularly in 1979 and 1980. 
In other words, the cost to taxpayers of Eximbank's direct 
lending program has been much greater than estimated 
before. 
Indirect Effects of Eximbank Lending 
This, of course, means that justifying Eximbank's lending 
program is much harder than before. To be worth 
continuing, the program must be producing large positive 
side effects which more than offset its large net direct costs 
to taxpayers. That cannot be clearly demonstrated yet. 
Several indirect benefits are often attributed to Eximbank 
Table 5 
Comparison of Rate Spread Estimates 
of Eximbank's Lending Subsidy 
Rate = Estimated 
Spread Discount Rate,/??* 
Average Interest Rate 
on Eximbank's New Loans,/?? 
This Study 
Wallen  CBO  OMB t  m*'-m  m*
h-m 
1976  n.a.  .01%  2.20%  1.00%  2.20% 
1977  n.a.  -.48  1.90  .40  1.30 
1978  n.a.  .35  1.50  .90  1.70 
1979  n.a.  1.35  n.a.  2.30  3.20 
1980  2.85%  3.50  2.20  4.20  5.40 
n.a. = not available 
t In someyears, the OMB used a range of opportunity rates, and in those instances, 
to compute a rate spread for this table, I chose the midpoint. The OM B published 
no subsidy estimates for 1979. 
Sources: U.S. Congress 1980,1981 a; U.S. President, various dates; my Table 2 
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lending, but they are very difficult to evaluate. So far, no 
one has been able to quantify them. (An attempt to do so is 
beyond the scope of this study.) In fact, no one has yet 
been able to conclusively argue that the alleged social 
benefits are truly benefits. Some of the attempts at such 
arguments are seriously flawed, and some are met by 
arguments that the effects in question might also be social 
costs. This leaves us with an ambiguity about the indirect 
effects of Eximbank lending that is beyond the current 
ability of standard economic analysis to resolve. 
A Way to Correct Market Failure 
in Export Finance? 
Some have argued that Eximbank lending benefits society 
by maintaining the optimal amount of export financing, an 
amount which private financial firms would not otherwise 
supply (Rendell 1976). The reason usually given for this 
alleged market failure is that most private financial firms 
do not have sufficient expertise to assess the risk of export 
loans. As discussed earlier, export loans involve risks not 
generally encountered in other types of lending, including 
the risk of government expropriation (sovereign risk) and 
the risk that the foreign borrower will be unable to obtain 
dollars to repay the loan (convertibility risk). Assessing 
such unusual risks requires unusual efforts from a lender, 
and most private firms are not prepared to make those 
efforts. This means, it is argued, that not many private 
firms are willing or able to lend in the export market 
(Rendell 1976, U.S. Congress 1981b). Without govern-
ment intervention, therefore, the supply of export financing 
would be inadequate. 
This argument overlooks the size composition of the 
U.S. financial intermediary industries, especially com-
mercial banking. While it is true that most private financial 
firms have no expertise in cross-border lending, large 
commercial banks such as those in my sample certainly 
do. They lend in many countries around the world, and, in 
doing so, routinely assess both sovereign and convertibility 
risk. Although the number of domestic banks which fit this 
description is limited (to perhaps 30), they hold about half 
of the nation's banking assets. Why couldn't these banks 
provide an adequate amount of export financing?
17 
A case can be made, in fact, that Eximbank lending is 
costing society by interfering with private market effi-
ciency rather than benefiting us by enhancing it. Private 
market failure is most often associated with markets which 
have few borrowers and lenders, infrequent trading, or 
risks that cannot be diversified. None of these character-
izes the world market for dollar-denominated cross-border 
loans. But Eximbank lending could be reducing the 
efficiency of this large competitive market by crowding out 
private financial firms which cannot compete with its 
officially subsidized terms. The extent of such crowding 
out is hard to assess since Eximbank has been operating 
long enough to create its own market niche. Given this 
argument, and the large existing banks, however, there is 
no doubt that many of the loans the agency made could 
have and would have been made by the private sector, 
though at somewhat higher rates (U.S. Congress 1981b, 
pp. 26-27). 
An Offset for the Effects 
of Other Nations' Subsidies? 
At least two arguments are made that Eximbank's 
subsidized export credit benefits U.S. society by offsetting 
the effects of other nations' export subsidies. Neither of the 
arguments is persuasive. 
One says that matching other nations' subsidies pre-
vents them from distorting the industrial composition of 
the U.S. economy. Such matching, the argument goes, 
ensures that the kinds and quantities of the goods being 
produced here are those which our private market would 
prefer. The view is set out in a recent study by Cruse and 
Whitsitt (1981, p. 1).
1
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 For Eximbank's subsidized loans, 
their study finds 
... an economic rationale and justification in the neutraliza-
tion of foreign official export credit—not on the grounds of 
equity to U.S. exporters, but on the basis that subsidized 
17Another reason often given for a failure in the market for export financing is 
that both sovereign risk and convertibility risk apply to entire countries or even 
regions of the world and are not easily diversifiable. This makes export lending 
simply too risky for risk averse private financial firms, it is argued, so that they are 
unlikely to supply the quantity or form of export finance the market demands. 
Often cited as evidence of such market failure is the fact that in recent years 
commercial banks have become virtually unwilling to make long-term fixed-rate 
export loans. Therefore, it is reasoned, Eximbank must "fill the gap" (U.S. 
Congress 1981b). 
This argument overlooks the fact that export finance is available from a 
number of private sources, not just banks. For example, dollar-denominated 
fixed-rate debentures may be sold by foreign importers or U.S. exporters, either in 
the United States or in the Eurobond market. Private market alternatives are 
available, at least to firms with sound credit ratings. In this respect, there is little 
difference between export and domestic finance, since most commercial banks 
prefer short maturities and/or floating rates on all their lending. If this preference 
is evidence of market failure, therefore, it is a general malaise not confined to 
export lending. 
18Although Cruse and Whitsitt are economists at Eximbank, they stress that 
their study is a "Personal Paper" which does not necessarily reflect the official 
positions of the agency. 
13 Eximbank credits allow the "true" market (instead of foreign 
governments) to determine the scope and structure of the 
U.S. industrial base. 
Although this argument is viscerally appealing, it is 
flawed. Say Eximbank were actually benefiting us to some 
extent by offsetting other nations' financing in an effort to 
preserve "the scope and structure of the U.S. industrial 
base." Nevertheless, if that is our objective, Eximbank is a 
costly way to try to achieve it. Remember, the subsidy in 
Eximbank lending is almost surely shared with foreign 
importers, and in this context they are unintended and 
unnecessary beneficiaries. A more efficient way to try to 
reach our objective would be to directly subsidize domes-
tic consumption of the appropriate goods. 
But that matching other nations' financing actually 
provides any social benefit of this type is not clear; it may 
instead interfere with the market and so be a social cost. 
From a global perspective, all export subsidies are indeed 
a source of distortion. That is, they increase the production 
of export goods above the market-determined, presumably 
efficient level. U.S. subsidies increase the total production 
of export goods just as subsidies from other nations do. In 
this global context, Eximbank lending does not offset other 
nations' distortions; it adds to them. 
Yet, some people argue that Eximbank's responses to 
foreign subsidies benefit U.S. society in another way: by 
stimulating the demand for U.S. goods and U.S. workers 
and so maintaining the nation's optimal amount of both 
exports and employment (Roberts 1980, U.S. Congress 
1981b). 
The benefit to employment is elusive. Sector-specific 
government programs such as Eximbank lending may 
increase labor demand in the industries involved, and this 
effect may be measured statistically (Bayard and Orr 
1980). That does not mean, however, that a nation's 
aggregate employment has necessarily been favorably 
affected; employment opportunities can be shifted among 
industries without increasing total employment. There is, 
in fact, a continuing debate among economists on the 
general question of whether government policies like 
Eximbank lending, which attempt to induce the demand 
for goods, actually have much, if any, sustained effect on 
aggregate employment (Lucas and Sargent 1979). This 
question is beyond the scope of my study. Given the 
debate, however, the effect of Eximbank lending on 
aggregate employment in the United States is certainly not 
clear. 
Nor is it clear how much effect subsidized financing has 
on the long-run demand for U.S. exports. The alleged 
benefit could easily be a cost. Liberalization of one 
nation's official credit terms is likely to evoke a policy 
response by others, and the chain reaction may never end. 
Some governments have recognized this problem and 
since 1973 have negotiated to reduce official subsidies to 
export finance. In 1978 the United States signed the 
Agreements on Guidelines for Official Supported Export 
Credits, which put voluntary limits on interest rates and 
repayment terms. These are generally viewed as ineffec-
tive, since signatory nations have frequently violated the 
guidelines, and attempts to negotiate further restrictions 
have had only limited success (Aboaf 1981, Pine 1981, 
U.S. Congress 1981b). Nevertheless, the negotiations 
themselves represent official recognition that competitive 
subsidization of export finance may be self-defeating 
rather than beneficial. 
A Foreign Policy Tool? 
This logically brings us to still another way Eximbank's 
lending program is sometimes said to benefit society, 
namely, as an instrument of official foreign policy (Roberts 
1980, U.S. Congress 1981a, b). In particular, the argu-
ment goes, Eximbank's lending terms can be strategically 
manipulated so as to influence the outcome of trade 
negotiations such as those mentioned above. In recent 
years, Eximbank has been used as a sort of club to wield 
over the heads of other major exporters. For example, the 
government of France has been viewed as particularly 
uncooperative in bargaining with the United States, and in 
response Eximbank has offered uniquely favorable terms 
on some export transactions in which France is the main 
competitor (Aboaf 1981). 
An analysis of the strategic political value of the 
Eximbank lending program is far beyond the scope and 
expertise of this study. However, I offer two observations. 
Over the period I studied, 1976-80, the United States 
made little detectable progress in achieving its objectives 
through trade finance negotiations (Aboaf 1981, Pine 
1981, U.S. Congress 198 lb). So if actual results of negoti-
ations are any measure of Eximbank's strategic value, that 
value is miniscule, at best. Admittedly, things might have 
gone even worse had Eximbank not existed. But then 
again, they might have gone better. A recent CBO study 
(U.S. Congress 1981a, p. x) did analyze Eximbank's stra-
tegic role, and it concluded that 
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Eximbank's Questionable Accounting Procedures 
The actual subsidy in Eximbank lending is probably greater 
than my estimates indicate because my estimates are based on 
income data reported by the bank. For two reasons, Eximbank's 
reported profits are overstated by some unknown amount. 
First, unlike private banks, Eximbank is not obliged to follow 
generally accepted accounting principles, and it doesn't. It is not 
required to make realistic provisions for loan losses or write off 
bad loans in a timely way. In fact, according to a General 
Accounting Office study of Eximbank (U.S. Congress 1981b, 
P. 14), 
No loans were written off in fiscal years 1979 and 1980, and 
only $8 million in loans has been charged off against income 
since 1934. For example, no determinations of uncollectibil-
ity have been made for delinquent loans of $26.4 million 
made in 1946 to the then recognized government of China 
and $36.3 million made to Cuba before 1961 when a prior 
export loans may be an important foreign policy tool, as the 
original circumstances of Eximbank's founding attest. But if 
that is its purpose, then control over loans might better be 
placed more directly under those responsible for foreign 
economic and political policies. 
Conclusion 
Half a billion dollars or more is quite a sum for taxpayers 
to pay each year for such tenuous indirect benefits. That's 
about how much Eximbank lending has been subsidized 
lately, according to my cost-benefit analysis. It is the most 
theoretically defensible study of the program done so far, 
and it estimates the subsidy to be large and growing 
rapidly. Previous studies of this program appear to have 
underestimated its subsidy—and my study may have too, 
considering Eximbank's unorthodox accounting methods 
(see the box). Even without taking that into account, 
however, Eximbank's lending program appears to be a 
program which society would be better off without. 
government existed. 
Second, Eximbank's interest income is probably overstated. 
Inevitably, some loans made by any lender have a sort of 
questionable status. That is, they are delinquent, and yet there 
remains a reasonable chance that they will ultimately be col-
lected. Private banks typically put such loans on a nonaccrual 
basis, which means that interest on these loans can be shown as 
income, but only as it is actually collected. Eximbank does not 
follow this procedure. Its reported interest income includes 
accrued interest which has not been collected yet—and may 
never be. In recent years, this type of interest has become a 
sizable component of Eximbank's reported income. In 1978, 
accrued interest on delinquent loans accounted for 7.9 percent 
of the bank's reported net income. In 1979, this share virtually 
doubled to 15.7 percent, and then in 1980 it ballooned up to 
84.5 percent. (See U.S. Congress 1981b, p. 17.) 
15 Appendix 
Deriving the Risk-Adjusted Cost of Capital 
Here I show how to derive the formula I use in the text to 
estimate my proxy for the appropriate rate at which to discount 
the returns on Eximbank lending. What the formula [equation 
(4) in the text] represents is the rate private firms would have 
received, had they made Eximbank's loans, written in terms of 
the cost of capital Eximbank would have faced, had it been a 
private firm. 
To begin to derive this formula, define V as the total market 
value of a private firm which is financed partly with debt,L, and 
partly with equity, Both debt and equity are risky, and r, and re 
are the expected rates of return which investors require on these 
claims. Further, defining I as the expected interest payments 
and 7f as expected profits, 
(Al) V = L + E = (I/r,) + (W/re). 
If ra = the expected rate of return on the firm's assets before 
taxes, A = total assets, and r = the corporate tax rate, assumed 
constant, then 
(A2) W = (raA - r,L) (\~t). 
I assume that the firm's assets are in a given risk class known 
to investors and abstract from the question of optimal capital 
structure by assuming that, if one exists, the firm is at it with 
(A3) L/V = K 
a constant. Product or factor markets may be imperfect, so that 
(A4) drJdA < 0. 
The firm's objective is to maximize its market value, V, net of 
the cost of acquiring assets, A, or 
(A5) max (V—A) 
A 
subject to equations (Al), (A2), (A3), and (A4). After rear-
rangement, the necessary condition which satisfies (A5) is 
(A6) rfl + Ar'a = [re(l-K)/(\-z)] + r,K. 
The left-hand side of (A6) is the equilibrium marginal rate of 
return on the firm's assets, which is what I want to estimate. 
Let's call this m*. In value-maximizing equilibrium, m* is set 
equal to a weighted average of the expected rates of return on 
debt and equity. The weights, K=L/V and 1 — K = E/V, are in 
market values and must sum to 1. Finally, the required rate of 
return on equity is adjusted by the factor l/( 1—r), reflecting the 
fact that returns to equity are taxable at the corporate level, 
whereas returns to debt are not. 
In general, V > A when (A6) holds. In the special case of 
perfect competition in the product and factor markets, (A6) 
simplifies to 
m* = ra = [re(l-K)/(\-T)] + nK. 
Scale is indeterminate, and in this case V = A. 
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